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From parliamentary to judicial supremacy:
Reflections in honour of the
constitutionalism of Justice Moseneke*
PETER G DANCHIN†
Justice Moseneke has presciently identiﬁed two interrelated dilemmas at the
heart of South Africa’s project of transformative constitutionalism: one concerning constitutional authority following the historic rejection of parliamentary supremacy; and the other concerning constitutional normativity
following the adoption in 1996 of a comprehensive Bill of Rights. This essay
advances two key arguments: First, that the rejection of parliamentary
supremacy has conventionally been understood in terms of a false opposition
between ‘parliamentary’ and ‘constitutional’ supremacy. And second, that
proponents of strong judicial review have paid insufﬁcient attention to three
core dangers of judicial supremacy: the displacement of self-government, the
reproduction of the problem of sovereignty and the usurpation by the
judiciary of the role of pouvoir constituent. This striking reversal in conceptions
of normativity and authority rests on a distinctive constitutional account of
popular sovereignty under which the will of the People is the source of
normativity while the courts, as adjudicators of reason, are the highest legal
authority. The paradox of this constitutional logic is that in order to justify the
anti-democratic consequences of strong judicial review, rights-based reasoning will increasingly need to be justiﬁed in terms of the will of the People with
attendant gravitational consequences for theories of adjudication. To achieve
Justice Moseneke’s call for an equitable balance between democratic will and
constitutional supremacy – and thereby maintain a robust rights-based constitutionalism – South African judges and legal scholars will need to grapple more
squarely with the twin dangers of judicial supremacy on the one hand, and the
essentially contested nature of constitutional rights on the other.

‘Every dawn seems to pose trenchant questions about our polity. The
questions are about our society in transition; about the usefulness and
relevance of our divided history. . . . These open, if not critical conversations suggest that there are no holy cows or orthodoxies beyond public
* This is a revised version of the paper presented at the symposium honouring Dikgang
Moseneke held at the Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town on 7 December 2016. I wish to
thank Penny Andrews, Hugh Corder, Danwood Chirwa and Mark Graber for helpful
discussion and comments. I wish also to express my gratitude and admiration to Justice
Moseneke for his remarkable contributions to South African constitutional law and
jurisprudence.
†
Professor of Law and Co-director of the International and Comparative Law Program,
University of Maryland School of Law; A W Mellon Visiting Fellow, University of Cape Town,
2013–14.
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scrutiny. No boundaries are ﬁnite and no lines are incapable of being
re-drawn or even crossed. In many ways, we live in a society of
unimaginable freedom and inﬁnite possibilities. The overarching constraint is whether our institutional arrangements and the cognate norms
are well suited to realize the just society the preamble to the Constitution
envisions.’
–Justice Dikgang Moseneke1
I INTRODUCTION
In his extra-curial writings and public speeches, Justice Moseneke has
often observed what he regards as a central tension lying at the heart of
South Africa’s democratic project of transformative constitutionalism.
Noting the increase in criticisms concerning the legitimacy of the
post-apartheid constitutional order, he has identiﬁed two recurring lines
of argument: First, that the ‘will of the people does not ﬁnd full voice
within constitutional arrangements . . . [and f]or this reason, legislative
and executive power in the hands of the parliamentary majority is
empty’.2 This is at bottom an issue of legal authority: ie whether it is
Parliament, or the courts, which ultimately decides what the law is.
Second, that ‘[c]onstitutional constraints on the exercise of public power
stand in the way of government to deliver on social equity . . . [such that]
the constitution has shielded the historic economic inequality from
change and in turn has obstructed the effective economic participation or
freedom of the majority’.3 The question of constitutional limits on public
power is at bottom an issue of legal normativity: ie what is the source and
justiﬁcation of the rights entrenched in the Constitution itself?
As Justice Moseneke has observed, the combined effect of these two
lines of argument concerning constitutional authority and normativity is
that ‘the will of the people on the project of transforming society is
frustrated by the supremacy of the Constitution and the role of courts in
policing its compliance’.4 On this account, the core challenge moving
forward is ‘whether our constitutional arrangement permits an equitable
balance between democratic will and constitutional supremacy?’5
This is a vital and increasingly embattled question in the post-apartheid
legal landscape, and Justice Moseneke stands as a pivotal and deeply
respected voice in the public debate. He has offered a robust but at the
1
Dikgang Moseneke ‘The balance between robust constitutionalism and the democratic
process’ Seabrook Chambers Public Lecture, University of Melbourne Law School, 16 June
2016.
2
Ibid 3.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
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same time nuanced defence of South Africa’s constitutional order and, in
particular, its core features of a comprehensive Bill of Rights accompanied by strong judicial review which, together, subject ‘majoritarian
primacy to the provisions of a Supreme Constitution’.6 In making this
case, Justice Moseneke has argued that:
Our founding mothers and fathers were well aware of th[e] deleterious impact
of parliamentary sovereignty and made a different choice. They sought to
bring to life a democratic state under the sway of a supreme constitution that
entrenches fundamental protections and a binding normative scheme.7

The question pursued in this essay is the persuasiveness of this case as a
matter of constitutional jurisprudence, especially as a response to the twin
dilemmas presciently identiﬁed by Justice Moseneke as surfacing in a
constitutional project that is still ‘young, tentative and just beyond
adolescence’.8 From the dual vantage points of comparative constitutional law and legal philosophy, the essay critically explores the questions
of constitutional authority and normativity and argues that a deep and
perilous paradox arises in their interrelation in any constitutional order.
The primary claim is that extant narratives in South Africa justifying the
need for a shift from ‘parliamentary’ to ‘constitutional’ supremacy have
uncritically adopted and paid insufﬁcient attention to certain distinct
conceptions of and controversies concerning legal authority and normativity. Over time, these underlying assumptions will exert a gravitational
pull towards a jurisprudence of strict legal textualism – the very species of
legal thought most closely, and paradoxically, associated with the worst
failings of the apartheid legal order. To achieve Justice Moseneke’s call for
an equitable balance between democratic will and constitutional
supremacy – and thereby maintain a robust rights-based constitutionalism
– South African judges and legal scholars will thus need to grapple more
squarely with the twin dangers of judicial supremacy on the one hand, and
the essentially contested nature of judicial review of constitutional rights
on the other.
II PARLIAMENTARY SUPREMACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY
As a matter of legal history, conventional wisdom holds that there were
two primary evils of the apartheid legal order: parliamentary supremacy
and strict legal positivism. This much-repeated narrative has its roots in
the anti-apartheid legal literature of the 1960s and 1970s. Consider, for
6
7
8

Ibid 6.
Ibid 13.
Ibid 1.

JOBNAME: Acta Juridica 17 PAGE: 4 SESS: 7 OUTPUT: Thu Dec 21 10:02:15 2017
/first/Juta/juta/acta−juridica17/A2

32

A WARRIOR FOR JUSTICE

example, the inaugural lecture of John Dugard at the University of the
Witwatersrand in 1971.9 While noting the law-making function of the
South African judiciary in developing the common law, Dugard suggested that judges in South Africa adhered to a ‘phonographic theory’ in
the interpretation of statutes which rested on the creed of legal positivism.
This creed was based on two core beliefs: ﬁrst, the Austinian command
theory of law as reﬂected in the principle of parliamentary supremacy; and
second, the need for a strict separation of law and morality – between the
law as it is and as it ought to be.10 Dugard noted that natural law theories
were never received with as much enthusiasm in England and were ﬁnally
destroyed by the advent of positivism and utilitarianism in the nineteenth
century. This English legal inﬂuence had spread to South Africa, as well as
Canada, Australia and New Zealand.11
Interestingly, however, Dugard noted that the United States was
colonised before the heyday of Sir Edward Coke, and thus before the
advent of Austin and Bentham, and in America ‘Coke’s natural-law
notion of a higher immutable law, which Parliament itself was obliged to
obey, took root and thrives today in American legal institutions’.12
Presciently, he raised the following query:
It is fascinating to speculate what would have happened had South Africa, like
America, been colonized by Britain in the seventeenth century. Would we
today have a rigid Constitution with a Bill of Rights and judicial review?13

Variations on this historical narrative are commonly heard today, not only
to explain, but also to justify core features of the post-1996 constitutional
order: constitutional supremacy, a Bill of Rights, and strong judicial
review exercised by a supreme Constitutional Court. The legal theoretical battle lines, and progressive trajectory of history, are thus both clearly
drawn. South Africa has rejected a sterile jurisprudence of strict legal
positivism that existed in an unjust legal order based on English-style
parliamentary supremacy in favour of a dynamic rights-based jurisprudence based on a higher or fundamental law of reason and justice
guaranteed by strong US-style judicial review.
Justice Moseneke himself appears to have endorsed the essential ratio9

John Dugard ‘The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty’ (1971) 88 SALJ 181.
Ibid 3–4.
11
Ibid 4–5.
12
Ibid 5. Dugard cites Dr. Bonham’s Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 113b, 77 ER 646 as support for
this proposition. For later discussion of the case and its legal implications in the American
colonies, see John Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978) 14–15 (arguing
that Coke’s statement in Dr. Bonham’s case later ‘formed the foundation for the Bill of Rights . . .
and in 1803 Chief Justice Marshall took Coke’s dictum to its logical conclusion when he
expounded the doctrine of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison’.)
13
Ibid.
10
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nale and historical inevitability of this account. In order to achieve its
substantive distributive and transformational aims, the Constitution–
had to be the supreme law beyond the whims and fancy of parliamentary
sovereignty. We are not again going to submit to legislative majoritarianism.
After all we had lived through parliamentary positivism. With meticulous
formalism, apartheid legislation still oppressed. It made unconscionable
inroads into fundamental rights and freedoms with impunity and yet it was
valid law. Mere rule of law and its attendant positivism is not a sufﬁcient
condition to avert repression and bad government and injustice. Apartheid
judges did not lack sound legal training and yet they were duty bound and did
to enforce laws that wreaked inestimable harm.14

Viewed through a comparative and theoretical lens, however, this otherwise appealing narrative of a simultaneous shift in constitutional authority
and normativity is open to critical question. To be clear, my concern is
not to defend any particular legal theory or type of constitutional order,
nor to deny the unremitting cruelty and injustice of the apartheid legal
order. Rather, my concern is that a widely accepted narrative both
misunderstands the constitutional theory of parliamentary supremacy
(and its supposed association with legal positivism) while at the same time
remaining inattentive to the dangers, limits and deeply contested foundations of a constitutionalism premised on judicial supremacy (and its
supposed association with a rights-based jurisprudence).
The ﬁrst confusion lies in a false opposition between ‘constitutional
supremacy’ on the one hand and ‘parliamentary supremacy’ on the other.
The implicit suggestion here is that in a system of parliamentary
supremacy, there is no ‘comfort of a muscular and supreme Constitution’15 which can ensure that the ‘judiciary is vested with plenary powers
of review of legislative and executive conduct’.16 The difﬁculty with this
juxtaposition, however, is that parliamentary supremacy is itself a principle
14
Dikgang Moseneke ‘A jurisprudential journey from apartheid to democratic constitutionalism’ 62nd Annual Meeting of American College of Trial Lawyers, 19 October 2012. In his
other writings, Justice Moseneke has re-emphasised the point:
Under apartheid, Parliament enjoyed supremacy and no constitution or bill of rights
provided any fetter on its legislative powers. Oppressive laws passed by Parliament could, for
the most part, not be challenged by the courts. The apartheid regime was sustained by [a] lack
of accountability and the construct of parliamentary sovereignty. . . . [A]t this time when the
South African Parliament enjoyed parliamentary sovereignty, the Appellate Division – and
[the] judiciary more generally – was a weak check on Parliament’s powers. Parliament was
able to make laws without substantive constraints; it essentially enjoyed a monopoly on
power.
Dikgang Moseneke ‘Striking a balance between the will of the people and the supremacy of the
Constitution’ (2012) 129 SALJ 9 at 14–15.
15
Dikgang Moseneke ‘Separation of powers, democratic ethos and judicial function’ Oliver
Schreiner Memorial Lecture, 23 October 2008.
16
Moseneke ‘A jurisprudential journey’ (n 14) (noting that ‘[t]his remarkable constitutional
architecture has afforded our senior judiciary unprecedented powers of judicial review’.)
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in the constitutional law of various parliamentary democracies. The
classic deﬁnition is provided by AV Dicey as–
neither more nor less than this, namely that Parliament . . . has, under the
English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and,
further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a
right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.17

This is a constitutional principle of legal authority, developed and recognised by the courts, which answers the question: Who ﬁnally decides what
the law is? Under the Constitution of the United Kingdom, the answer is
provided in three doctrinal points:
1. Parliament can make laws concerning anything.
2. No Parliament can bind a future parliament (i.e. it cannot pass a law
that cannot be changed or reversed by a future Parliament).
3. A valid Act of Parliament cannot be questioned by the court:
Parliament is the supreme lawmaker.
The doctrine says nothing about what the law is, or should be, or what
substantive provisions (eg a Bill of Rights) a constitutional legal system
should include. Rather, it provides that the pouvoir constitué recognised
under the Constitution to settle legal questions is not the courts, nor the
executive (nor, lest we forget in prior times, the monarch), but Parliament. If there is a contested social issue, division or conﬂict among the
people, their representatives and indeed among the judges themselves
concerning a basic question of constitutional rights, then it is Parliament
that has the ultimate authority to decide and settle the question through
voting in the legislature.
Consider the recent division in the courts in Stransham-Ford v Minister of
Justice and Correctional Services and Others, a case concerning the right of an
individual to physician-assisted suicide. Justice Fabricius in the High
Court held that, in so far as they provide for an absolute prohibition in the
context of assisted suicide by medical practitioners, the common law
crimes of murder or culpable homicide unjustiﬁably limit the constitutional rights to human dignity and freedom to bodily and psychological
integrity.18 On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that
the High Court had been wrong to develop the common law on the
grounds of an infringement of constitutional rights. Justice Wallis for the
court reasoned inter alia as follows:
It is of course possible that Parliament will, as has occurred in other countries,
intervene and pass legislation on the topic. That would be welcome if only
17
AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Constitution (1885), cited in AW Bradley and
KD Ewing Constitutional and Administrative Law 14 ed (2007) 54.
18
Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others 2015 (4) SA 50 (GP).
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because it would give effect to the proper role of Parliament in a society where
the doctrine of the separation of powers has application. Lobby groups could
then make their voices heard and a proper debate and process of reﬂection
could occur. In general, whilst recognising the role that the Constitution
confers upon the courts, it is desirable in my opinion that issues engaging
profound moral questions beyond the remit of judges to determine, should be
decided by the representatives of the people of the country as a whole.19

This mode of reasoning goes to the heart of the matter and illustrates a
second confusion. What is essentially in conﬂict is not parliamentary as
opposed to constitutional supremacy, but rather parliamentary versus
judicial supremacy (both being subject to the supremacy of the Constitution.) As noted above, Justice Moseneke rejects the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy for lacking not only the ‘comfort of a muscular and
supreme Constitution’, but also a ‘judiciary . . . vested with plenary
powers of review of legislative and executive conduct’. This criticism rests
on two interrelated points: ﬁrst, regarding the nature of a written (as
opposed to unwritten) Constitution; and second, regarding the nature
and scope of judicial review. Let us consider each point in turn.
(1) Written versus unwritten Constitution
In a comparison of the United Kingdom and United States Constitutions,
John Gardner has explored the distinction between an ‘unwritten’ or
‘uncodiﬁed’ constitution on the one hand and a ‘canonical constitutional
master-text’ on the other.20 In the case of the former, what determines the
status of rules as part of the constitution is not how they are created (their
‘special origin or process of enactment’) but rather how they are received
(their ‘treatment in either the customs or the decisions of certain lawapplying ofﬁcials, principally the courts’.) Even though the UK Constitution is partly comprised of various ‘canonical’ Acts of Parliament
understood to impose constitutional limits on political institutions
(including the courts),

19
Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others v Estate Late James Stransham-Ford and
Others 2017 (3) SA 152 (SCA) at 62–3. The judgment cites with approval the views of Lord
Sumption in Nicklinson on the proper role of Parliament in cases of this type: ‘In my opinion,
the legislature could rationally conclude that a blanket ban on assisted suicide was ‘‘necessary’’ in
Convention terms, i.e. that it responded to a pressing social need. I express no ﬁnal view of my
own. I merely say that the social and moral dimensions of the issue, its inherent difﬁculty, and
the fact that there is much to be said on both sides make Parliament the proper organ to deciding
it.’ R (on the application of Nicklinson and others) v Ministry of Justice [2014] 3 All ER 843 (SC)
para 233.
20
John Garner ‘Can there be a written constitution?’ Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper
No 17/2009 (8 May 2009) at 2–4.
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they remain part of an unwritten constitution, for their constitutional status –
their entry into the constitution – comes of the unwritten law of the
law-applying ofﬁcials who subsequently treat them as having that status.21

Such an unwritten Constitution notably includes customary, extra-legal
rules – what Dicey termed ‘conventions of the constitution’ – that can
become part of the law of the Constitution through the courts ‘treating
them as law’.22
The point here is that, unlike a written Constitution, the tradition of
unwritten English constitutionalism locates its foundations not in a
spontaneous act of autonomous sovereign will but in a living discursive
tradition of historical legal thought and practice which precedes and shapes
acts of sovereign will. This unwritten Constitution has no sole or uniﬁed
author or moment of posited creation; rather, it pre-exists the sovereignty
of the state and is recognised as controlling the exercise of public
authority.
For a political theorist such as Edmund Burke, the virtue of such a
constitutional theory is that it is rooted not in the rational egoism of the
popular sovereign imagined to stand at the centre of Enlightenment
political thought but in the ancient history and traditions of one’s
ancestors and ultimately in human experience itself.23 In this respect, the
British constitutional tradition is a partnership among ‘those who are
living, those who are dead, and those who will be born’.24 As Talal Asad
has noted, the notion of a normative discourse established through history
is central to any conception of a discursive tradition:
These discourses relate conceptually to a past (when the practice was instituted, and from which the knowledge of its point and proper performance has
been transmitted) and a future (how the point of that practice can best be
secured in the short or long term, or why it should be modiﬁed or abandoned),
through a present (how it is linked to other practices, institutions, and social
conditions).25

At the heart of English constitutional discourse is the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, a constitutional rule developed primarily by the
21

Ibid 5.
Ibid 10 (citing AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885) 23–4
(deﬁning ‘conventions of the constitution’ as ‘customary constitutional rules which the courts
may note, rely upon, and accommodate in applying the law but of which the courts’
applications are not authoritative, even for the immediate purposes of the case before them’.)
23
Edmund Burke Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) in The Works of the Right
Honorable Edmund Burke vol 3 (1899). See further Jeremy Waldron Nonsense Upon Stilts:
Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (1987) 77.
24
Burke (n 23) at 359.
25
Talal Asad ‘The idea of an anthropology of Islam’ Occasional Paper Series, Center for
Contemporary Arab Studies (1986) at 14.
22
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courts themselves. While the courts act as the guardians of constitutional
normativity by determining the legal effect of Acts of Parliament, Parliament retains its position as the ultimate legal authority by always being able
to overrule the courts through relegislation.
This arrangement rests on a distinctive jurisprudential logic. The will of
the people – including in relation to conﬂicts of rights and liberties – is
expressed ultimately through legislation enacted in Parliament. The
meaning and legal effect of that expressed will, however, is determined
through its reception and interpretation in the reason of law-applying
ofﬁcials, primarily in the judicial reasoning of the courts.
As we shall see in Part III below, this logic has important implications
for theories of both judicial review and rights-based reasoning. For
present purposes, it is sufﬁcient to observe that this constitutional tradition departs markedly from the foundational premises of American-style
constitutionalism which is based on a written constitution. In US jurisprudence, the Constitution is fundamentally understood to be the result of
an exceptional act of popular self-determination. The canonical constitutional master-text is the expression of a super-majoritarian act of popular
will and competing accounts of popular sovereignty both underlie and
deﬁne the legitimacy of the constitution itself. As Paul Kahn explains:
Popular sovereignty in the United States is distinctly not a conception of
self-government through elections that express the majority will as it emerges
from constantly shifting coalitions. Political theory may give us such a process
view of popular-sovereignty, but to pursue this path is like thinking that we
can understand religious faith by examining church attendance statistics. The
popular sovereign is a trans-temporal, omnipresent, and omniscient plural
subject.26

This notion runs throughout American constitutional history. It is perpetually rearticulated in landmark Supreme Court cases such as New York
Times Co v Sullivan where Justice Brennan famously interpreted the
‘central meaning of the First Amendment’ as being intimately connected
to Madisonian and Jeffersonian notions of popular sovereignty.27
My point here is not to explore the complex and intricate terrain of
theoretical treatments of popular sovereignty in modern constitutional
thought. Rather, following Kahn, it is to observe that within this
constitutional tradition the law acquires its authority and legitimacy not

26

Paul Kahn ‘Sacriﬁcial nation’ The Utopian 29 March 2010.
376 US 254 (1964). See further William J Brennan, Jr ‘The Supreme Court and the
Meiklejohn interpretation of the First Amendment’ (1965) 79 Harvard Law Review 1;
Harry Kalven, Jr ‘The New York Times Case: A note on ‘‘the central meaning of the First
Amendment’’ ’ (1964) Supreme Court Review 191; Alexander Meiklejohn Political Freedom: The
Constitutional Powers of the People (1948).
27
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primarily from its qualities of reason or the justice of its demands, but from
its connection to the will of the sovereign. Again, as Kahn makes the
point:
We have a sacred text – the Constitution – which we understand as the
revelatory expression of the popular sovereign. We also have rituals of
sovereign action – elections as well as judicial decisions. We believe that unless
an assertion of governmental authority can be traced to an act of popular
sovereignty, it is illegitimate. This is precisely the meaning of judicial review,
which serves as a constant afﬁrmation of our belief that we live under the rule
of law, not men. Judicial review shows us explicitly the linkage of popular
sovereignty and the rule of law.28

On this view, the authority of the courts derives directly from their claim
to articulate the meaning of the canonical constitutional master-text
which is itself a ‘remnant’ of popular sovereignty. Such a logic is almost
exactly opposite to that of the unwritten English Constitution. Constitutional normativity is now understood to lie not in the accumulated
wisdom and discursive reason of historically constituted discourses but in
an extraordinary act of popular self-determination as expressed in a
canonical master-text. At the same time, ultimate legal authority is now
understood to lie not in Parliament, but in the courts and their exercise of
judicial review, including in the case of both the United States and South
Africa in the power of judicial review over not only executive action, but
also of legislation.
This signiﬁcant reversal in conceptions of normativity and authority
correlates to the two challenges identiﬁed by Justice Moseneke to the
legitimacy of contemporary South African constitutionalism: the dual
criticism that ‘the will of the people on the project of transforming society
is frustrated by the supremacy of the Constitution and the role of courts in
policing its compliance’.29
Let us turn then to the second question of parliamentary versus judicial
supremacy, before exploring in Part III the relationship between this
question and the nature of judicial review in the context of a rights-based
written Constitution.
(2) Parliamentary versus judicial supremacy
Recall Dugard’s primary indictment of parliamentary supremacy during
the apartheid era being its association with a ‘phonographic theory’ of
strict legal positivism and the corresponding absence of a ‘natural-law
notion of a higher immutable law, which Parliament itself was obliged to
obey, [as] took root and thrives today in American legal institutions’.30
28
Paul W Kahn ‘Speaking law to power: Popular sovereignty, human rights, and the new
international order’ (2000) 1 Chicago Journal of International Law 1, 3.
29
Moseneke (n 1).
30
Dugard (n 9).
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We can now see, however, that as a matter of normativity there is no
inherent or necessary connection between the doctrine of parliamentary
supremacy and a jurisprudential philosophy of legal positivism.
Whether developing the common law; interpreting and applying
statutes; reviewing executive action; or indeed interpreting and recognising the unwritten rules of the Constitution, rights-based reasoning is a
distinguishing feature of the common-law tradition and judges have
historically developed an array of doctrines to ensure that considerations
of fairness, equity and justice shape judicial reasoning and interpretation
of legal norms. Indeed in the pre-apartheid era, equality before the law
was a core premise in judicial reasoning of the courts in South Africa.31 In
Australia, this is the main argument advanced against the adoption of a
substantive Bill of Rights: ie the notion that fundamental rights are
already adequately protected by the common law and freely elected
legislatures.
On this view, the great evil of the apartheid legal system was not
parliamentary supremacy per se, but rather the violation of its core
premises: democratic self-government and cherished principles of representation and political equality. Through the complete denial of universal
adult suffrage on grounds of race, the apartheid constitutional system
accorded ultimate legal authority to an unjustly constituted political
institution. Where the legislature is representative and elected on a basis of
political equality, the case for parliamentary supremacy as a theory of legal
authority is signiﬁcantly more normatively attractive (even, as Jeremy
Waldron has argued, in relation to minority groups with the state).32
What then explains and, more importantly, justiﬁes the shift in South
Africa from parliamentary to judicial supremacy, paradoxically at the very
moment apartheid was rejected and representative democracy and a freely
elected legislature fully embraced? The most apparent answer is that the
post-apartheid South African Constitution was deeply inﬂuenced by the
immediate post-Cold War project and euphoria of liberal constitutionalism as promoted and inspired mainly by the example of the United States
and other leading Western democracies.33
The core features of this tradition are popular sovereignty, a substantive
Bill of Rights and strong judicial review (often in the hands of a supreme
31
See eg Williams and Adendorff v Johannesburg Municipality 1915 TPD 106; Minister of Posts
and Telegraphs v Rasool 1934 AD 167.
32
Jeremy Waldron ‘The core of the case against judicial review’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal
1346.
33
For discussion of this phenomenon, see Samuel Issacharoff ‘Comparative constitutional
law as a window on democratic institutions’ Elgar Research Handbook on Comparative Judicial
Review (2018 forthcoming) 5 (noting that what uniﬁed the courts established in post-1989
democracies was the power of judicial review as part of a ‘new democratic organization of
political power’.)
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constitutional court). In 1989, the Soviet scholar Vasily Vlasihin thus
deﬁned ‘constitutionalism’ as–
a written constitution per se surrounded by a cloak of unwritten principles,
values, ideals, procedures, and practices. Without attempting to list the entire
ﬁle of attributes of American constitutionalism, let me single out the key ones.
Making up the core of constitutionalism are the ideas of ‘popular sovereignty’
and a social contract as the source of the government; the principles of
republicanism, federalism, separation of powers, and government limited by
law; respect for the rights and liberties of citizens and the protection of private
property; the rule of law and the supremacy of the Constitution; the independence of the judiciary and judicial review.34

Recall in this context that apart from South Africa, Dugard also mentioned Canada, Australia and New Zealand as countries similarly inﬂuenced by the English tradition of parliamentary supremacy. It is
interesting to reﬂect that in the wake of the post-1990 tide of Americanstyle constitutionalism, these countries have embraced entrenchment of
constitutional rights but not the kind of strong judicial review of legislation under a Bill of Rights that deﬁnes the American constitutional
tradition.
In Canada, courts may decline to apply a statute if it violates a provision
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but this power is
subject to the ‘notwithstanding clause’ of the Constitution under which
legislation may be declared by Parliament to be insulated from this
scrutiny.35 In New Zealand, an even weaker form of judicial review
exists. Courts may not decline to apply legislation when it is found to
violate the rights set out in the Bill of Rights Act of 1990, although they
are directed to prefer an interpretation whenever possible that avoids such
a violation.36

34
Vasily Vlasihin ‘Political rights and freedoms in the context of American constitutionalism:
A view of a concerned Soviet scholar’ (1989) 84 Northwestern University Law Review 257, 258.
See further Louis Henkin ‘Elements of constitutionalism’ Occasional Paper Series, Center for the
Study of Human Rights, Columbia University (August 1994).
35
Section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides:
(1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of
Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof
shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of
this Charter.
(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration made under this
section is in effect shall have such operation as it would have but for the provision of
this Charter referred to in the declaration.
36
Section 4 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 provides:
No court shall, in relation to any enactment . . . [h]old any provision of the enactment to be
impliedly repealed or revoked, or to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or [d]ecline to apply
any provision of the enactment – by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any
provision of this Bill of Rights.
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In Australia, judicial review is an axiomatic part of the legal system
despite the fact that (like the United States) there is no provision in the
Australian Constitution expressly conferring such a power on the
courts.37 But as noted earlier, the Australian Constitution does not have a
Bill of Rights and its constitutional jurisprudence has focused principally
on the relationship between federal and state legislative and executive
power rather than on individual rights.
In Australian High Court practice, the post-Cold War era similarly
heralded a period of rights-based activism from 1987 to 1995 under the
leadership of Chief Justice Anthony Mason whereby the court sought to
develop a jurisprudence based on ‘implied’ constitutional rights and
freedoms.38 The notion, however, that the High Court has the authority
to imply a constitutional freedom and then employ such an implication as
the basis to invalidate legislative or executive action (in addition to
developing the common law) created strong controversy in the Australian
legal system. Under the subsequent leadership of Chief Justice Murray
Gleeson, this implied rights jurisprudence and conception of judicial
review has steadily declined.39
What then are the reasons for this reluctance of modern democracies
(with their origins in the English tradition of parliamentary supremacy) to
embrace ‘strong’ judicial review: that is, the ‘authority to decline to apply
a statute in a particular case (even when the statute on its own terms
plainly applies in that case) or to modify the effect of a statute to make its
application conform with individual rights (in ways that the statute itself
does not envisage)’?40 The answer lies in the perceived dangers and
political implications of ‘judicial sovereignty’:
[T]he prospect of judicial sovereignty is no better than any other kind of
sovereignty and considerably worse than forms of rule that are disciplined
ultimately by accountability to the people. However inferior the judgments of
the people seem to the judgments of a judge, we like the idea of self-governing

Section 6 further requires that ‘[w]herever an enactment can be given a meaning that is
consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be
preferred to any other meaning’.
37
Kathleen E Foley ‘Australian judicial review’ (2007) 6 Washington University Global Studies
Law Review 281.
38
Nationwide News Proprietary Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1; Australian Capital Television
Proprietary Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106.
39
Foley (n 37) at 316. Foley notes that the ‘Gleeson Court’s dominant approach to
constitutional interpretation is textualism combined with a form of ‘‘soft’’ originalism’. See also
Dan Meagher ‘Guided by voices? – Constitutional interpretation on the Gleeson Court’ (2002)
7 Deakin Law Review 261, 283.
40
Jeremy Waldron ‘Judicial review and judicial supremacy’ Public Law and Legal Theory
Research Paper No 14–57 (November 2014) at 8.
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republic and we are not at all sure that that is compatible with the ultimate
authority of courts in the Constitution.41

Not simply radical or conservative, but also leading liberal public law
scholars such as Jeremy Waldron and Mark Tushnet have advanced
sophisticated, sustained and trenchant critiques of strong judicial review.
There is much to be learned from these counter-narratives as well as from
the increasingly obvious pathologies and dysfunction of American constitutional law and judicial politics.
Waldron has identiﬁed three main ‘evils’ of judicial supremacy: First, as
already noted, the displacement of self-government (‘the tendency of any
arrangement that allows . . . vital and divisive questions to be settled by
the courts’).42 Second, the reproduction of the Hobbesian problem of
sovereignty that makes the judiciary into a ‘new Sovereign’ (‘whether
judicial power represents the rule of law or represents a sort of judicial
super-sovereign that itself escapes the authority of the rule of law is a
perennial problem in rule of law studies’).43 And third, the usurpation of
the role of pouvoir constituent in so far as the constitution is concerned (the
idea that ‘no constituted power may be identiﬁed – or identify itself –
directly or indirectly with the people or claim the credentials of the
popular sovereign’).44
In each of these points lie different but related dangers: ﬁrst of
dominating government; second of institutional hegemony above the
law; and third of the power to deﬁne and redeﬁne the Constitution. What
then ﬁnally is the relationship between these related dangers of judicial
supremacy as a theory of legal authority and the normative sources and
justiﬁcation of the constitutional order itself? It is on this point that a deep
paradox and ever-increasing legitimacy crisis arises for the courts, especially for present purposes the Constitutional Court of South Africa.
41

Ibid 2.
Waldron cites (at 12) Abraham Lincoln’s First Inaugural Address: ‘[I]f the policy of the
Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably ﬁxed by
decisions of the Supreme Court . . . the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having
to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.’
43
Waldron notes (at 15) that ‘Hobbes rejected the logic of constitutionalism. It is, he said a
mistake to think that you can limit sovereignty with a constitution, because you have to do it
with some other political entity – in this case a court.’
44
The point is that the ‘courts, even the highest court, is not le pouvoir constituent. It is a
constituted power, set up by the constitution. It is un pouvoir constitué.’ (ibid at 19). Waldron
discusses (at 20) the ‘negative Sieyès principle’ which holds that ‘a constitutional system must be
ordered in such a way as to prohibit (and to reduce the prospect and plausibility of) any
constituted power taking upon itself the mantle of le pouvoir constituent. The question then
becomes ‘to what extent are the courts claiming to speak for the people (and thus violating the
negative Sieyès principle) in the way they exercise their powers of judicial review? To what
extent are they taking on the mantle of the people, when they set up their own interpretations
and repudiate interpretations of the constitution which emanate from the other branches?’ Ibid
at 24.
42
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III CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LEGAL NORMATIVITY
The Bill of Rights and newly created Constitutional Court are today
two of the most widely admired features of the post-apartheid 1996
Constitution. Section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution entrenches strong
judicial review requiring the courts to declare any law or conduct
inconsistent with the Constitution to be invalid to the extent of its
inconsistency. In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, the Constitutional Court
deﬁnitively held that all public power is controlled by and subject to the
written Constitution, which is supreme law.45
(1) The justification of judicial review
What theory or basis of legitimacy does the Constitutional Court’s power
of judicial review rest upon? This is a critical question as South African
legal history itself has shown that the adjudication of constitutional rights
can be as ideological and political as any act of the legislature. In his
analysis of the apartheid legal order, John Dugard himself observed that in
the mid-nineteenth century in both the Orange Free State and South
African Republic, attempts were made – inﬂuenced strongly by the US
Constitution – to revive natural law philosophy in rigid Constitutions
with which the laws of the respective Volksrade were obliged to conform.46
In the Orange Free State Constitution of 1854, the legislature (Volksraad) was ‘non-sovereign’ and certain fundamental rights were expressly
guaranteed.47 As illustrated by the case of Cassim and Solomon v The State,48
however, the ‘equality-before-the-law provision was read in accordance
with the mores of the Voortrekkers. Some people were accepted as more
equal than others and race was not an irrelevant factor in making such a
determination.’49
In the South African Republic (Transvaal), the status of the Constitution (Grondwet) of 1858 was less clear. But in the famous case of Brown v
Leyds NO (1897) 4 OR 17, Chief Justice Kotzé of the High Court –
citing Marbury v Madison (1803) – held that certain informal laws or
besluiten were invalid on the grounds of incompatibility with the Grond45
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of South
Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC).
46
John Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978) 18–19.
47
In 1898, Judge JMB Hertog of the Orange Free State High Court expressly rejected the
doctrine of legislative supremacy in The State v Gibson holding that the ‘Volksraad is beyond
doubt the highest legislative authority, but still not unqualiﬁedly the highest authority. Above the
legislative authority stands the constitution-giving authority – that is, the sovereign people, to
whom the majesty belongs.’ (1898) 15 Cape Law Journal 1 at 4, cited in Dugard (n 46) at 19.
48
(1892) 9 Cape Law Journal 58.
49
Dugard (n 46) at 19. This line of reasoning was achieved by granting the franchise only to
‘citizens’ and deﬁning eligibility for citizenship in terms of race.
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wet. This reasoning was premised on the basis that (a) ‘sovereignty vested
in the people of the Republic and not in the Volksraad’; (b) ‘the
Constitution created fundamental law with which the Volksraad was
obliged to conform’; and (c) it was the ‘duty of the court to declare invalid
measures which were not in conformity with the Grondwet’.50
At a similar time in the United States during the Lochner-era, from the
1880s to the late-1930s, state and federal courts struck down up to 170
statutes that constituted a progressive programme of economic and social
amelioration. A majority of the Supreme Court marked out a stance of
broad opposition to the legislative program of the government establishing in effect a ‘stand-off’ and ultimately a constitutional crisis of power
between the elective branches of government and the judiciary.
These historical examples vividly illustrate Waldron’s second and third
evils of judicial supremacy: the interrelated dangers of the judiciary
becoming in effect a new sovereign, or ‘super-sovereign’, that itself
escapes the authority of the rule of law, thereby allowing a constituted
power to usurp the role of pouvoir constituent by identifying itself with the
sovereignty of the people.
As argued in Part II, the analysis of this dilemma by proponents of
strong judicial review is premised on the mistaken assumption that under
the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy the legislature is somehow
superior to the Constitution. In the case of the 1858 Transvaal constitution, Dugard thus states that it–
was not made clear whether the Grondwet created fundamental law and
whether the Constitution was superior to the legislature, although there were
several articles that seemed to point to the sovereignty of the people, not the
Volksraad.51

This sentence conﬂates and confuses the issues of constitutional authority
and normativity. There can be no doubt as a normative matter that the
Volksraad was subject to the Grondwet as a matter of constitutional law.
Rather, what was in doubt was a question of constitutional authority:
whether it was the Volksraad, or the courts, which ultimately had the
power under the Grondwet to determine what the law was on any
particular issue.
This allows us to see the second mistaken assumption made by
proponents of strong judicial review: the notion that, while the legislature

50
Dugard (n 46) at 21. The decision precipitated a constitutional crisis and President Kruger
declared the testing right – and thus the notion of higher law – to be a ‘principle of the Devil’
and proclaimed the supremacy of the Volksraad. Ultimately, Chief Justice Kotzé was dismissed
by the President (ibid at 22–4).
51
Dugard (n 46) at 20.
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is superior to the Constitution under the principle of parliamentary
supremacy, in the case of judicial review under a written Constitution the
courts are somehow inferior to and merely the ‘voice’ of the Constitution.
Justice Moseneke is one of the few jurists clearly to have seen the
emerging volatility of this contradiction:
[I]t must be conceded that, if there is a danger in parliamentary supremacy,
there is also a danger in constitutional supremacy. Contemporary attacks on
the Constitutional Court as undermining popular will have traction precisely
because they are rooted in a legitimate fear. A tension clearly exists between
democratic theory and constitutional supremacy.52

It is vital to see once again, however, that the dilemma is not one of
‘constitutional supremacy’ or the need to impose entrenched ‘normative
constraints on majoritarian politics’. All of this is consistent and compatible with parliamentary supremacy and its underling justiﬁcation of
expressed democratic will. Rather, the dilemma is one of privileging the
authority of the courts over the legislature in possessing the ultimate power
to decide the effect of those constraints through judicial review of
legislation.
The dilemma raises instead the question of what is often referred to as
the ‘counter-majoritarian difﬁculty’,53 the need to justify judicial review
– and therefore judicial as opposed to parliamentary supremacy – as a
‘necessary mechanism for preserving the Constitution, for guaranteeing
fundamental rights and for enforcing limits that the Constitution itself
imposes on governmental power’.54 This raises a deep paradox concerning the normative source and justiﬁcation of rights-based constraints.
(2) The source and justification of constitutional rights
We have seen that some account of popular sovereignty underlies both
the normativity and ultimately the legitimacy of the written Constitution
itself.55 The constitutional text is the link between the rule of law and the
will of the popular sovereign. Again, as Paul Kahn explains:
The starting point for understanding the American rule of law is the idea that
the law gains its authority not from the justice of its demands, but from the will
of the sovereign. This is an old idea in jurisprudence, but it is experienced as a
52
Moseneke (n 1) at 15. The locus classicus of the tension between democratic theory and
judicial review is John Hart Ely Democracy and Distrust (1980).
53
The term was ﬁrst used by Alexander Bickel The Least Dangerous Branch (1962) at 16
(describing the view that judicial review stands in tension with democratic theory by allowing
unelected judges to overrule the law-making of elected representatives, thus undermining the
will of the majority).
54
Moseneke (n 1) at 16.
55
See Kahn (n 28) and accompanying text.
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literal truth in America: the authority of the judge derives directly from his or
her claim to articulate the meaning of texts that are themselves ‘remnants’ of
popular sovereignty.56

This is categorically not, however, how the Bill of Rights in the South
African Constitution (and other democratic states) is understood or
interpreted by the courts and, in particular, by the Constitutional Court.
Rather, an international legal and universal moral theory of human rights
is more often invoked by judges seeking to justify the imposition of
constitutional limits on democratically enacted legislation. The Bill of
Rights is, in this sense, understood to be part of a wider global project of
constitutionalism premised on the protection of fundamental human
rights.
Despite signiﬁcant differences in their time of composition, constitutional formulation and elaboration by courts, Waldron has argued that
international and regional human rights charters as well as the ‘bodies of
law relating to fundamental rights of each major democracy’ collectively
represent ‘attempts by their respective framers to get at roughly the same
subject matter: what important rights do individuals have – what rights
may they peremptorily assert – simply by virtue of being human?’57 On
this view, international human rights law and constitutional law on
fundamental rights are each part of a common normative order standing
in a relation of ‘dual positivization’.58
Justice Moseneke has endorsed a robustly global view of constitutionalism as underpinning the South African Bill of Rights:
The premium placed by many jurisdictions on both democracy and constitutional supremacy derives from the prioritization of human rights in the wake
of the Second World War and in our case in the wake of apartheid and colonial
repression. Constitutionalism, on this view, reﬂects contemporary democracies’ commitment to ‘entrenched, self-binding protection of basic rights and
liberties’ in an ‘attempt to secure vulnerable groups, individuals, beliefs, and
ideas vis-à-vis the potential tyranny of political majorities, especially in times
of war, economic crisis, and other incidents of political mass hysteria.’59

56

Kahn (n 26) at 3.
Jeremy Waldron ‘Human rights: Universalism or the integrity of a common enterprise?’
(1 September 2016). NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No 16–48, available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2848611 at 2–3. At the national level, Waldron mentions
the UK Human Rights Act; the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act; Germany’s Basic Law of 1948;
the US Bill of Rights; the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and the Bill of Rights of
the Constitution of South Africa.
58
Gerald L Neuman ‘Human rights and constitutional rights: Harmony and dissonance’
(2003) 55 Stanford Law Review 1863, 1864ff (discussing the ‘institutional consequences of
embodying the human rights ideology in two parallel regimes of positive law’).
59
Moseneke (n 1) at 23–4.
57
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This view has two main implications: ﬁrst, that democracy itself should be
understood in terms of a new political theory of sovereignty, one that
Justice Moseneke terms (mistakenly in my view) ‘constitutional
supremacy’ which has now displaced the older, discredited principle of
‘parliamentary sovereignty’; and second, that the fundamental rights in
the Constitution should be ‘robust enough to withstand even change by
an elected parliament’ by virtue of the exercise of the power of judicial
review, which itself should be understood not as undemocratic but as
‘reconcilable with majority rule’.60
The central claim in this essay is that this double argument in fact
constitutes a reversal in the conceptions of constitutional authority and
normativity in South Africa – a reversal which over time will have
paradoxical and unintended consequences for a robust and democratic
rights-based constitutionalism. As discussed in Part II, the source of
constitutional normativity on this view – including the Bill of Rights – is
ultimately some account of popular sovereignty understood as a positive
act of creation which expresses the super-majoritarian will of the people in
a canonical constitutional master-text. The ultimate source of constitutional authority, however, is the judiciary and, in particular, the Constitutional Court vested with the power of strong judicial review.
As time progresses and the court is called upon to decide difﬁcult and
often momentous questions concerning the meaning and hierarchy of
constitutional rights, the supremacy of judicial (as opposed to legislative)
authority will increasingly be called into doubt. The perception of a
legitimacy deﬁcit is likely to be heightened by modes of judicial reasoning
and interpretation which go beyond the text and seek to rely on the
purported universality and binding nature of human rights. The underlying difﬁculty is that this conception of constitutional normativity and
authority suggests not only that ultimate legal authority lies in the hands of
unelected judges, but that legal normativity lies in some essential sense
external and superior to the South African legal order itself as judges act to
recognise or receive universal human rights norms into domestic constitutional law.61
Given the open-textured nature of rights provisions and the essentially
interpretive nature of rights-based reasoning,62 critics will be quick to
60

Ibid.
The most well-developed account of this view is that by Harold Hongju Koh ‘Why do
nations obey international law?’ (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2599 (advancing a theory of the
relationship between domestic and international law in the international or ‘transnational’ legal
process tradition involving the interaction, interpretation and internalisation of human rights
norms). See also Harold Koh ‘International law as part of our law’ (2004) 98 Am. J. Int’l Law 43;
Harold Koh ‘The globalization of freedom’ (2001) 26 Yale J. Int’l L. 305.
62
See Jeremy Waldron ‘A rights-based critique of constitutional rights (1993) 13 Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 18, 19 (discussing the ‘difﬁculty, complexity, and controversy attending
61
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attribute both the source and justiﬁcation of controversial judicial decisions not to the universal demands or claims to justice of human rights
norms, but to the value judgments, political preferences and individual
biases of the judges themselves.63 This criticism will be especially acute in
instances of landmark cases such as S v Makwanyane and Another64 which
involve persistent, substantial and good faith disagreements about rights,
ie cases involving basic questions concerning what the commitment to
fundamental rights means and what the legal implications are of such
rights, especially where complex conﬂicts of rights arise.
One of the earliest commentators on the post-apartheid Constitution
presciently observed that a sea change had occurred in South African law
and argued that ‘the explicit intrusion of constitutional values into the
adjudicative process signals a transition from a ‘formal vision of law’ to a
‘substantive vision of law.’’65 Having reviewed the docket of the Constitutional Court in its ﬁrst year, however, Cockrell perceived instead the
‘absence of a rigorous jurisprudence of substantive reasoning, for what we
have been given is a quasi-theory so lacking in substance that I propose to
call it ‘‘rainbow jurisprudence’’.’66 He proceeded to give three examples
of such reasoning:
In interpreting the Bill of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms . . . an allinclusive value system, or common values in South Africa, can form a basis
upon which to develop a South African human rights jurisprudence.67
In broad terms, the function given to this Court by the Constitution is to
articulate the fundamental sense of justice and right shared by the whole nation
as expressed in the text of the Constitution.68
This evaluation must necessarily take place against the backdrop of the
values of South African society as articulated in the Constitution and in other
legislation, in the decisions of our Courts and, generally, against our own
experiences as a people.69

In each of these passages, we see the judges straining to reconcile two
opposing accounts of constitutional normativity, one premised on popular sovereignty (‘common values in South Africa’ . . . ‘shared by the whole
nation as expressed in the text of the Constitution’ . . . ‘the values of South
African society as articulated in the Constitution’) and the other on
human rights and a universal account of reason (‘an all-inclusive value
the idea of basic rights’ and suggesting caution about ‘the enactment of any canonical list of
rights, particularly if the aim is to put the canon beyond the scope of political debate and
revision’).
63
See eg Alfred Cockrell ‘Rainbow jurisprudence’ (1996) 12 SAJHR 1.
64
1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).
65
Cockrell (n 63) at 3.
66
Ibid at 11.
67
Makwanyane (n 64) para 307, 500H (Mokgoro J).
68
Makwanyane (n 64) para 362, 514C–D (Sachs J).
69
S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) para 59, 650D (Langa J).
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system’ . . . ‘the fundamental sense of justice and right’ . . . ‘the backdrop
of . . . values’).
For Cockrell, this early attempt at normative reconciliation was a
failure for two reasons: ﬁrst, because ‘statements such as these ﬂit before
our eyes like rainbows, beguiling us with their lack of substance’; and
second, because they seem ‘intent on denying the existence of deep
conﬂict in the realm of substantive reasons, assuming as they do that
constitutional adjudication is all about normative harmony rather than
normative discord’.70 As theorists of rights have long argued, the critical
point is that ‘substantive reasons are difﬁcult reasons; they require hard
choices to be made between moral and political values which are
inherently contestable and over which rational people will disagree’.71
(3) The paradox of popular sovereignty and judicial review
I do not intend to explore the complex legal and political philosophical
relationship between popular sovereignty and human rights. Rather, I
wish merely to observe the paradox that arises in all modern constitutional
thought from this variation on the ancient question posed by Socrates to
Euthyphro:
Euthyphro: I would say that what all the gods love is holy . . .
Socrates: The point which I want to resolve ﬁrst is whether the holy is
beloved of the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved
of the gods.72

Recall John Gardner’s discussion of the distinction between a written and
unwritten Constitution: are the rules of the Constitution valid because
posited or posited because valid? In the case of a written Constitution, the
validity of constitutional rules is determined ultimately by how they are
created (their ‘special origin or process of enactment’). In the case of an
unwritten Constitution, however, validity is determined ultimately by
how certain norms are received (their ‘treatment in either the customs or
the decisions of certain law-applying ofﬁcials, principally the courts’).73
70

Cockrell (n 63) at 11.
Ibid. See generally Jeremy Waldron The Dignity of Legislation (1999) at 4 (developing a
normative theory of legislation in response to the idea that ‘[p]eople have become convinced
that there is something disreputable about a system in which an elected legislature, dominated
by political parties and making its decisions on the basis of majority-rule, has the ﬁnal word on
matters of right and principle’.)
72
Plato ‘Euthyphro’ in Benjamin Jowett’s edition of the Dialogues vol II (1871) 84, cited in
John Gardner ‘Law as a leap of faith’ (2000), available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1397138 at 1.
73
See n 20 and accompanying text in Part II (1). I say ‘ultimately’ because the dialectic
between creation and recognition of rules operates in complex ways in each case. Many
American judges, for example, adopt a Lockean ‘social contract’ view of the Bill of Rights in the
US Constitution understood to reﬂect a pre-existing normative order of natural or fundamental
71
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The paradox that arises is as follows: in order politically to justify the
exercise of strong judicial review on the basis of entrenched constitutional
rights – and thus strike down or modify laws enacted by democratic
majorities – the courts will increasingly be drawn towards the gravitational pull of popular sovereignty. The adjudication of constitutional
rights will be justiﬁed not in terms of the demands of reason or justice, but
the expressed will of the sovereign people (a uniquely ‘South African
human rights jurisprudence . . . shared by the whole nation as expressed
in the text of the Constitution’).
The irony of this logic is that in order to avoid the charges of
subjectivity and political bias in making complex value judgments, the
courts will similarly be drawn over time towards a jurisprudential philosophy of formalism and textualist legal positivism – the very theory Dugard
associated with the worst failings of the apartheid legal order. This has
unquestionably been the experience of the United States Supreme Court
over the last half century as the liberal rights ‘activism’ of the Warren and
Burger courts has been overtaken by the textualism and originalism of the
Rehnquist and Roberts courts.
The success of the legal philosophy of Justice Antonin Scalia is the
clearest illustration (and warning) of this trajectory. Indeed, it was precisely because of the wide and seemingly unconstrained discretion of
judges exercising strong judicial review under a written Constitution
(unlike in the United Kingdom) that Justice Scalia argued so forcefully in
favour of textualism and originalism:
The principal theoretical defect of nonoriginalism, in my view, is its incompatibility with the very principle that legitimizes judicial review of constitutionality. . . . Central to [Marshall’s analysis in Marbury v Madison] . . . is the
perception that the Constitution, though it has an effect superior to other
laws, is in its nature the sort of ‘law’ that is the business of the courts – an
enactment that has a ﬁxed meaning ascertainable through the usual devices
familiar to those learned in the law. If the Constitution were not that sort of
‘law,’ but a novel invitation to apply current societal values, what reason
would there be to believe that the invitation was addressed to the courts rather
than the legislature? . . . Quite to the contrary, the legislature would seem a
much more appropriate expositor of societal values, and its determination that
a statute is compatible with the Constitution should, as in England, prevail.74

rights. For the reasons advanced infra, such classical ‘liberal’ theories of constitutional rights
have become increasingly difﬁcult to justify in a culture dominated by American exceptionalism (in the form of popular sovereignty) and legal positivism (in the form of textualism and
originalism).
74
Antonin Scalia ‘Originalism: The lesser evil’ William Howard Taft Constitutional Law
Lecture, 16 September 1988.
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Today, it is broadly accepted by judges across the political spectrum on the
US Supreme Court that textualism and originalism are at least the proper
starting points for constitutional adjudication.75 Similarly in the legal
academy, various theories of a ‘new originalism’ have been advanced by
prominent constitutional law scholars.76
Consistent with Paul Kahn’s thesis of a constitutional theology
grounded in popular sovereignty, judges are no longer viewed as continuing the ‘deliberative process of reason’ by working from ‘a speciﬁed list of
human rights – those rights necessary for a free and democratic order – put
forth in numerous, overlapping conventions’. Rather, the contextual
exercise of reason itself has begun to look illegitimate:
What is it that American judges do, if they are not applying reason to discern
the progressive path of rights in particular contexts? They are interpreting a
text. Their authority comes not from the application of universal reason, and
certainly not from the appeal to an ‘‘all things considered’’ judgment of
reasonableness. All American debates over legal rights are hermeneutical:
judges and lawyers argue over the appropriate interpretive attitude to bring to
that text. . . . The authority of the American constitutional text comes neither
from a claim of democratic legitimacy, nor from a claim of justice . . . [r]ather,
the authority of the constitutional text derives from its appearance as an act of
popular sovereignty. This text is the remnant, the evidence, of sovereign
presence.77

Popular sovereignty in the American constitutional imagination generates
a distinctive conception of judicial authority as grounded essentially in
discerning the will of the popular sovereign as expressed in the canonical
master-text. The role of the judge is not to interpret, but to read the
constitutional text, which is ‘a trace, a remainder, of the presence of the
popular sovereign’. The judge’s ‘will is determined by his sight. Reading
becomes an act of seeing.’ This form of spectral knowledge is coupled
with ‘an appeal to original history: temporal proximity to sacred presence
carries its own weight’. In this way, the judge can appear to ‘subordinate
himself to a law outside himself’ while simultaneously ‘call[ing] the nation
back to its sacred origin’. To the extent that the judge engages in
reasoning that looks beyond the constitutional text and invokes other

75
See eg Elena Kagan’s remarks while Dean of Harvard Law School in 2007 (Scalia’s ‘views
on textualism and originalism, his views on the role of judges in our society, on the practice of
judging, have really transformed the terms of legal debate in this country’).
76
See eg Jack Balkin Living Originalism (2011); Jack Balkin ‘The new originalism and the uses
of history’ (2013) 82 Fordham Law Review 641; Lawrence B Solum ‘What is originalism? The
evolution of contemporary originalist theory’ (28 April 2011), available at: SSRN: https://ssrn.
com/abstract=1825543 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1825543; Randy E Barnett ‘The
gravitational force of originalism’ (2013) 82 Fordham Law Review 411.
77
Kahn (n 26) at 7.
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sources of authority or the contextual demands of justice, criticisms
immediately arise regarding the illegitimacy of judicial review.
Over time, this logic generates a remarkable paradox. The exceptional
nature of the popular sovereign that is the normative source and legitimacy of the constitutional order is understood in increasingly universalistic terms: the idea of the rational, self-determining liberal subject.
Conversely, the universal ‘higher’ law that reﬂects the will of the popular
sovereign is understood in increasingly personal and exceptionalist terms:
as ‘our supreme law’. In this way, rightness is understood not in terms of a
contextual, pluralistic tradition of reason but the true ascertainment of the
unitary, rational will of ‘the People’.
Precisely the opposite logic operates in the case of the discredited
theory of parliamentary supremacy. As discussed in Part II, the ultimate
source and legitimacy of the unwritten constitution lies not in a positive
act of will of the popular sovereign, but in an historical discursive tradition
of legal thought and practice. In this tradition, the courts have a wide and
substantive scope of authority to engage in modes of reasoning that seek
ways to realize and protect rights in particular contexts and to balance
competing claims of right. This exerts a gravitational force away from or
beyond a particular historically situated legal order and towards the claims of
universal reason and justice.
This rich tradition of rights-based adjudication is legitimate precisely
because it is understood to be subject to the doctrine of legislative
supremacy. In instances of moral or political controversy surrounding
rights, the decisions of the courts are always subject to the overarching
authority of the democratically elected legislature to settle such questions
through deliberation and ultimately majority vote. This ironically draws
the legislature towards, rather than away from, the moral demands of
reason, thereby offering the possibility of both a strong deliberative
democracy coupled with a robust tradition of rights-based adjudication.
Recall that under the theory of popular sovereignty, normativity is
understood to lie in the will of the popular sovereign while legal authority
lies in the courts as the supreme interpreters of that will as reﬂected in the
higher law of the text of the Constitution. Under parliamentary sovereignty, by contrast, normativity is understood to lie in a pluralistic and
ﬂexible tradition of discursive reason while ultimate legal authority lies in
the democratic will of the people as exercised through their representatives in the legislature.
This view is not, of course, immune from criticism or without its own
internal weaknesses. The idea of a largely unwritten discursive constitutional tradition may be unattractive, unavailable or unjust in certain
respects, while the notion of ﬁnal legal authority in the hands of
democratic majorities – as widely noted in the literature – may itself pose
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threats to the protection of minority and individual rights.78 Similarly,
there may well be powerful and original ways of understanding the theory
and practice of popular sovereignty in the South African constitution that
depart signiﬁcantly from the eighteenth-century assumptions and path
dependencies of the American tradition.
But as a resolution of the basic dilemma identiﬁed by Justice Moseneke
as between constitutional supremacy and democratic will, the tradition of
parliamentary supremacy offers much from which we can learn. Once the
false opposition between constitutional and parliamentary supremacy is
made visible and the various pathologies of judicial supremacy as a theory
of constitutional authority squarely confronted, we can begin to see how
competing conﬁgurations of normativity and authority generate different
– and often paradoxical – forms of constitutional politics. Given that
South Africa has opted for a model of strong judicial review, this should
open the space for new conversations regarding the praxis and effective
implementation of rights-based adjudication.
IV CONCLUSION
This essay has advanced two key arguments. First, that the rejection of
parliamentary supremacy in South Africa has conventionally been understood in terms of a false opposition between parliamentary and constitutional supremacy. And second, that proponents of strong judicial review
have paid insufﬁcient attention to three core dangers of judicial
supremacy: the displacement of self-government, the reproduction of the
problem of sovereignty and the usurpation by the judiciary of the role of
pouvoir constituent.
This striking reversal in conceptions of normativity and authority rests
on a distinctive constitutional account of popular sovereignty under
which the will of the People is the source of normativity while the courts,
as adjudicators of reason, are the highest legal authority. The paradox of
this constitutional logic is that in order to justify the anti-democratic
consequences of strong judicial review, rights-based reasoning will
increasingly need to be justiﬁed in terms of the will of the People. As a
matter of jurisprudence, this will exert an increasing inward gravitational
pull towards formalism, textualism and originalism.
The idea of a constitutional legal tradition not grounded in an express
act of popular sovereignty may seem deeply anti-modern and conservative in the Burkean sense. But it allows us to see more clearly the merits of
78
See eg Richard H Fallon ‘The core of an uneasy case for judicial review’ (2008) 121
Harvard Law Review 1693; Frederick Schauer ‘Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution’
(2004) 92 California Law Review 1045. See also Ronald Dworkin Freedom’s Law: The Moral
Reading of the American Constitution (1996) (arguing that judicial enforcement of entrenched
rights is an essential institutional feature of a democratic society).

JOBNAME: Acta Juridica 17 PAGE: 26 SESS: 7 OUTPUT: Thu Dec 21 10:02:15 2017
/first/Juta/juta/acta−juridica17/A2

54

A WARRIOR FOR JUSTICE

locating will not in a conception of metaphysical normativity, but in
human authority – the decisions of a democratically elected legislature –
while at the same time locating reason not in judicial authority, but in a
conception of discursive normativity – an historically evolving, pluralistic
and living legal tradition. As a matter of jurisprudence, this view paradoxically exerts an increasing outward gravitational pull towards substantive
reason and conceptions of the universal.
Justice Moseneke has astutely identiﬁed and presciently sought ways to
reconcile the indelible tensions between these two visions of constitutionalism lying at the heart of the post-apartheid legal order. He has
argued that the Bill of Rights ‘enshrines the rights of all people in our
country and afﬁrms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and
freedom’.79 The future of this order and its widely admired recognition of
the universality of human rights and claims to justice rests on a clear-eyed
appraisal of both the revolution in constitutional normativity that has
occurred and the increasing perceptions of illegitimacy that the exercise
of judicial authority is likely to generate. By according critical attention to
the dangers of judicial supremacy, normative space can remain open and
receptive to the kind of robust rights-based reasoning that we treasure
in the personal integrity and constitutional jurisprudence of Justice
Moseneke.

79

Moseneke (n 1) at 6–7.

